



KfW Research

# »»» International migration in a long-term perspective

## **Imprint**

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## Abstract

Migration is a complex multifaceted phenomenon, with the focus of public debate currently on forced displacement. Generally speaking, however, international migratory movements are driven by economic and social factors and their changes in the course of development. These include demographic change, industrialisation and changes in the labour market and financial system development. These factors can promote or reduce international migration, depending on the context and how they interact, creating different migratory patterns for national economies.

Data on international migration at global level show that

- international migration is relatively **rare**. Only a small portion of the world's population lives outside their home country. Migration within countries is more common.
- international migration occurs primarily within **world regions**. More than half of migrants move within their own world region.
- the number of migrants and countries of origin has increased, while destination countries are still dominated by a small group.
- at one time in the early 1990s, the number of **refugees** also peaked. At the time, it even reached a higher share of the world population than in 2015/2016.

The structural-economic factors of national economies change in the long-run and influence the migratory movement of the population:

- A substantial share of the world's population lives in countries in which rising levels of **economic development** can initially be expected to lead to growing emigration. Not until a country has reached an upper-middle income level does migration stabilise, before it decreases again as it continues developing.

- A **young and fast-growing population** in developing countries provides the pool that feeds emigration. In order for this potential to be realised, however, further factors such as economic structural change must come into play.
- The incentives for migration evolve in the course of **economic structural change**. In many developing countries, industrialisation is stagnating, or deindustrialisation is setting in prematurely compared with today's industrialised countries. Incentives for migration diminish only when industrialisation continues or a growth model is found that provides comparable employment and income opportunities.
- Developing countries have a lot of catching up to do to achieve average **per-capita income levels** that are similar to those of industrialised countries so that further convergence would reduce migration incentives. If international income gaps were the sole determinants of international migration levels, however, much stronger migratory movements would be observable than is actually the case. At the same time, not all inhabitants of a country will benefit equally from its development so that migration offers a pathway out of relative disadvantage.

In addition to the structural conditions mentioned above, migration is influenced by and sensitive to further factors. A look at four **African countries** illustrates this, although the often weak data situation hampers deeper analysis. In the Democratic Republic (DR) of Congo and the Central African Republic, two countries that are shaped by low levels of development and marred by violent conflicts, migration is determined by refugee movements. Equatorial Guinea, a country with high per-capita GDP but very unequal income distribution, is experiencing labour migration, while for Mauritius circular migration and climate change are important topics.

## Structure of the report

International migration is a complex phenomenon. Its complexity ranges from issues of definition and measurement to the explanation of causes and effects in the affected countries. The present report shows this complexity and focuses on long-term developments.

The first section provides an overview of the problems of definition and measurement, describes the extent of international migration, and interprets developments over time:

**Migration is a global phenomenon**

**Difficult data situation hampers analyses**

**Share of migrants in global population is relatively constant**

**Forced migration: flight and displacement**  
Flight as a response to conflict

Climate change and environmental disasters as drivers of displacement

There is scope for expanding current knowledge of the drivers of migration, which is concentrated on the impacts on target countries and possible economic explanations. The migration drivers we will look at in the present analysis are the long-term structural transformations that are inherent in the development of national economies and form the conditions for migration at macro level:

**Migration and level of development**

More migration is to be expected as a result of low-income countries' economic development

**Migration transition and demographic transition**

Young population as migration potential

**Migratory transition and structural change**

Industrialisation and urbanisation are changing the conditions for migration

**Migration as a way of safeguarding income**

**Inequality within and between countries as a major determinant of migration**

Inequality between countries as a cause of migration

Inequality within countries is an incentive for migration

These long-term structural transformations in the development process overlap each other and together determine a country's underlying migration pattern. Additionally, more short-term developments, particularly events such as war and environmental disasters, can lead to forced displacement and can

dominate long-term migration. Climate change as a cause of migration also has a long-term effect. The significance of these factors will be illustrated using the examples of four African countries whose development levels are comparable on a pair basis but which have very different net migration rates:

**Democratic Republic of Congo:**

From an immigration to an emigration country

**Central African Republic:**

Weak data situation, flight and displacement predominate

**Equatorial Guinea:**

Still a destination country for labour migrants

**Mauritius:**

Environmental refugees and promotion of circular migration

Other major facets of migration, e.g. the consequences for the labour market in the country of origin and destination, responses of migration policy, the significance of migration networks and the importance of migrants' remittances for the countries of origin as well as causes of migration at meta- and micro-level would go beyond the scope of this report and will therefore not be considered.

## Migration is a global phenomenon

Since 2015, the debate in Europe and in Germany has been shaped by the refugee influx, particularly through the Balkan routes and the Mediterranean. But displacement and migration are not new phenomena, nor are they limited to Europe. The issue of (illegal) immigration to the US, either directly from Mexico or from other Latin American states via Mexico as a transit country, reports about the flight of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar and Australia's immigration policy are only a few examples. Older debates about potential migration movements after the fall of the Berlin Wall between Germany's western and eastern federal states or after the accession of Eastern European states to the EU also show the facets of the migration topic. In the latter case, only Ireland, the UK and Sweden granted unlimited, free movement of labour from the start. But the other EU states – fearing that too many migrants would come – made use of their option to limit access to their labour markets from citizens from the accession countries for up to seven years.<sup>1</sup>

People are mobile, they migrate and shift the centre of their life. This mobility ranges from settling to new lands to relocation within a city. People cross borders in the context of international migration. Leaving a country also provides a way for people to reveal their opinion

about political, social and economic developments. States that forbid emigration thus prevent people from ‘voting with their feet’ about social and economic conditions. Examples include North Korea or, historically, the states of the former Eastern bloc. At the same time, states seek to direct and control the level and composition of migration. While a right exists for people to leave their country, there is no right to immigrate to another country.<sup>2</sup>

Subject to all the imponderables involved in quantifying international migration, it is evident that it is a global phenomenon. Hardly any country has no migrants (see Figure 1). As a traditional immigration nation, the US has a 14% share of migrants in the population. Germany and Australia are also on this level, with 15 and 17%. In Canada, Kazakhstan and New Zealand the share ranges from 20 to 23%. At the top of the leaderboard, however, and by a wide margin, are the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait, where 74 to 88% of the population are migrants.

#### Difficult data situation hampers analyses

Analyses of migration as a basis for an informed debate are being hampered by the fact that different definitions of migration exist and concepts are not being distinguished with accuracy (see Box 1). In Germany, distinctions are made between asylum seekers and refugees, migrants and persons with a migrant background, immigrants as all persons coming to Germany and immigrants as persons coming to Germany with the intention to stay.<sup>3</sup> States also define migration differently for statistical purposes, even if


efforts are underway to harmonise and provide comparable data – as is the case in the EU.<sup>4</sup> It is therefore possible to define the phenomenon of international migration based on the country of birth, citizenship or residence in combination with the duration of stay.<sup>5</sup> Differences in national statistics often arise from whether a country also registers its own citizens, students, asylum seekers or irregular migrants.<sup>6</sup> In more than half the countries and territories listed in the UN statistics, persons born outside the country are counted as migrants (see Table 1). Foreigners defined as citizens of other countries form the basis for the statistic in one fifth of countries. Refugees are counted as well in some cases. As a result of the difficult conditions for collecting data, unregistered migrants and missing figures have to be estimated.

Data on migrants residing in the respective country are only a snapshot because returnees, for example, are not captured and therefore only limited information is available on the scale of return migration.<sup>7</sup> Historians estimate the return migration rate during the migration wave from Europe to America in the 19th century at 30 to 40%.<sup>8</sup> But today as well, return migration rates are likely substantial – despite all the differences between countries.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the OECD estimates that between 20 and 50% of immigrants leave a country again within the first five years.<sup>10</sup> They either return to their country of origin or migrate onwards to a third country.<sup>11</sup>

Migratory movements are also difficult to measure.<sup>12</sup> A look at how emigrants and immigrants are registered in practical terms makes this very clear. In Germany, for

#### Figure 1: Global distribution of migrants

Share of migrants living in the respective country, in per cent, 2010–2015.



Source: WDI, based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision.

**Table 1: Migrants captured in UN statistic**

	Number of countries and territories	Share in the number of countries	Share in migrants
Persons born abroad	132	57	64
Persons born abroad+refugees	48	21	17
Foreigners*	25	11	5
Foreigners*+refugees	19	8	13
Foreigners*+persons born abroad	1	0	1
Foreigners*+persons born abroad+refugees	1	0	0
Projections	4	2	0
Projections+refugees	2	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Migrants as persons residing in the respective country, \*foreign citizenship.

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015), own calculations.

example, Section 17 of the Federal Act on Registration (*Bundesmeldegesetz*) stipulates that ‘anyone who moves out of a residence and does not move into a new residence in Germany must register with the registration office within two weeks of moving out.’<sup>13</sup> Non-compliance is an administrative offence that carries a penalty of up to EUR 1,000<sup>14</sup>. Whether this provides sufficient incentive to deregister is questionable, particularly since the person in question is no longer in the country. As a result of the measurement problems, figures on migratory movements are available for significantly fewer countries than on the number of migrants residing in the respective country.<sup>15</sup>

**Share of migrants in the population is relatively constant at global level**

The share of international migrants in the population has been relatively constant at global level since World War II.<sup>16</sup> In the 1960s, 2.4 or 3.1% – depending on the data source – of the world’s population was counted as international migrants. By 2017 that share rose to 3.4%.<sup>17</sup> Thus, the vast majority of the world’s population lives (for returnees: again) in their country of birth or in a country whose citizens they are (see Figure 2 and Box 2).

Considering the relatively low level of international migration, it is hardly surprising that the globalisation and international integration of workers is lower than the globalisation of trade and capital.<sup>18</sup> The international migration of workers as measured by income differences is too low for that, although the majority of

**Box 1: Definitions of migrants and migration**

Migration is defined as the spatial transfer of the centre of life of an individual, family, group or population with the aim of an extended period of residence.<sup>19</sup>


Migration is generally defined as the permanent or temporary transfer of a person’s place of residence. A more informative definition, however, is the spatial transfer from a social unit or neighbourhood to another that puts a strain on or breaks up previous social bonds.<sup>20</sup>

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM)<sup>21</sup> defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.

The United Nations defines migrants as persons who move to a country other than that of their usual residence for a period of at least one year, irrespective of the causes (voluntary or involuntary migration) and type (regular or irregular migration). Tourists and businesspeople are therefore not defined as migrants. The term does apply, however, to other short-term migrants, such as seasonal workers who travel for a brief period of time to plant or harvest agricultural products.<sup>22</sup>

**Figure 2: Population development and number of migrants at global level**

Migrants as persons residing in the respective country.



WDI: World Development Indicators, GBMD: Global Bilateral Migration Database

Sources: WDI, GBMD, UN.

international migrants is classified as labour migrants.<sup>23</sup> Indirectly, however, existing migration in combination with the impacts of increased trade and international investment as well as the diffusion of technological progress<sup>24</sup> has greatly changed national labour markets.<sup>25</sup>

Even if the share of migrants in the global population is relatively stable, the number of international migrants nearly tripled in the period under review. South-South migration and North-South migration have both increased. Nonetheless, international migration takes place primarily within the global regions. With the exception of North America and Oceania, more than half of migrants come from a country that belongs to the same global region as the destination country (see Figure 3).<sup>26</sup>

### Box 2: International migration as a form of mobility


In international migration, crossing a national border counts as a defining characteristic, whereas internal migration takes place within a state's borders. The distance travelled does not play a role in this classification. Moving from Los Angeles to New York is therefore defined as internal migration although the distance between the two cities is 3,700 km as the crow flies. The distance from Tripoli to Berlin is 2,200 km and from Bordeaux to Warsaw 1,800 km but the first two places are on different continents while the second are separated by national borders.

International migration is regarded as quantitatively less significant than internal migration.<sup>27</sup> The longer the distance and duration of the relocation, the lower is the level of migration measured.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, in order to measure internal migration, a decision must be made whether a relocation to another city, another administrative district or another federal state is counted as migration. What also needs to be defined is how long the length of stay has to be.<sup>29</sup>

Migratory movements have changed significantly over the course of time.<sup>30</sup> The perception that the extent, diversity and distances of international migration have increased is primarily due to changes in spatial migration patterns and, hence, different experiences at regional level.<sup>31</sup> The distances travelled have indeed increased and more countries are connected by migratory movements. The number of countries of origin in particular has grown, while a relatively small number of destination countries continue to dominate global migration.<sup>32</sup> This implies that emigration patterns are very similar, i.e. there are more countries of origin but a strong overlap in countries of destination.

### Figure 3: Migrants by region of origin and destination

Migrants as persons residing in the respective global region, Percentages of regions of origin



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015). Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015).

If migration were possible without any of the obstacles and resource limitations, according to a Gallup poll 14% of adults the world over would move permanently to another country. This figure is significantly higher than the share of the population that actually migrates.<sup>33</sup> New Zealand, Australia and Oceania, North America and Europe would experience net population growth if these migration intentions were realised. The other regions of the world, for their part, would lose out.

### Forced migration: flight and displacement

It is hardly possible to distinguish precisely between international migration and flight to other countries. On the one hand, refugees are also migrants because – irrespective of their motive for migrating – they move the centre of their life outside their country's borders and for a longer period of time. On the other hand, they are distinguished from migrants in that they are governed by the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the Additional Protocol of New York (see Box 3).<sup>34</sup> This legal definition meets the mixed motives of the affected persons. Refugees are typically driven to leave their country by mixed motives – particularly a combination of poverty and insecurity. In addition, these motives can change during their migration. Persons who initially leave their home country for economic reasons may become refugees during their migration.<sup>35</sup>

The number of refugees who have fled to other countries has grown significantly since 2012. In 2017

**Box 3: Definition of forced displacement**

In everyday language, a ‘person who has left or been forced to leave their home country in haste for political, religious, economic or ethnic reasons, leaving behind their possessions’<sup>36</sup> is referred to as a refugee but in officialese a person is not recognised as a refugee until their request for asylum has been formally granted. What matters here is not the subjective cause or urgency of migration but the legal fact.

In order to be classified as a refugee in the meaning of the Geneva Convention on Refugees<sup>37</sup> and the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), a person must be persecuted on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group.<sup>38</sup> In addition there are asylum seekers whose refugee status has not yet been determined.


The IOM<sup>39</sup> counts a person as a refugee if they fulfil the criteria of the UNHCR statute and qualifies for protection by the United Nations High Commissioner, irrespective of whether that person is staying in a country that is a party to the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees or whether the person has been recognised as a refugee or not by the host country under one of these instruments.

Displaced or forcibly displaced persons are those who have fled their home country or communities for reasons other than those that make them a refugee under the definition of the UNHCR. These reasons include internal conflicts or natural disasters and other devastation.<sup>40</sup>

the number of international refugees worldwide totalled 25.4 million (19.9 million persons under UNHCR mandate and 5.4 million Palestinians under UNRWA mandate) and 3.1 million asylum seekers, the highest figure since records began.<sup>41</sup> Most of them are located in the respective neighbouring countries and regions. Thus, the highest share of refugees who have fled to other countries can be seen in the population of the regions of conflict in the Middle East and Africa (see Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Worldwide distribution of refugees**

Percentage of refugees in the population of the destination country, 2017.




Refugees according to the Geneva Convention on Refugees and UNHCR including persons who have been granted refugee-like humanitarian status and persons granted temporary protection, excluding asylum seekers.

Source: World Bank (WDI); own calculations

In the West Bank and Gaza, nearly half the population are refugees, in Jordan around one third and in Lebanon nearly one quarter. In Turkey, the country that has had the world’s highest refugee intake in absolute terms over the past years, refugees make up around 4% of the population. The conflicts in Africa and the Middle East have led to the known refugee influx to

**Figure 5: International refugees**



Note: International refugees according to the UNHCR, without UNWRA, asylum seekers or internally displaced persons.

Source: UNHCR, [www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/historical-migrant-crisis/?noredirect=on&noredirect=on](http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/historical-migrant-crisis/?noredirect=on&noredirect=on).

Europe so that as a consequence, European countries also have a substantial share of refugees in the population in a worldwide comparison. However, that proportion exceeds the one per cent mark only in Sweden, Norway, Austria, Malta, Germany and Switzerland.

In a global comparison, Venezuela also has a high share of refugees and persons in refugee-like situations in the population. Most of them come from Columbia,<sup>42</sup> which suffered massive internal displacements<sup>43</sup> and conflicts between the government and paramilitary forces. At the same time, the economic and political crisis in Venezuela has itself created a refugee exodus. Since 2014, more than 1.5 million Venezuelans have left their country.<sup>44</sup> However, only a portion of them have applied for asylum (some 280,000 persons) or applied for an alternative legal status<sup>45</sup> (around 570,000 persons). More than half, however, have no regular status which leads to corresponding uncertainties and difficulties.


The average duration of exile dropped from 14 years in 2012 to 10 years in 2017. More than half of refugees have been in exile for less than four years.<sup>46</sup> This is due primarily to newly added refugees, who reduce the average duration. At the same time, there were around 3 million Afghans who fled their country after the Soviet invasion and have lived in exile for the past 37 to 40 years.

Even if the systematic capture of the number of refugees did not begin until the year 2000, the refugee numbers recorded in the early 1990s already reached a very high level of around 17 million persons under UNHCR mandate (see Figure 5). In comparison with the global population, that rate was even higher than today (0.32 vs. 0.26%). The majority of refugees came from former Yugoslavia from where they had fled 'ethnic cleansing' operations during the war. The civil wars in Somalia and Liberia, political repression in Togo, the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the power struggle in Tajikistan and the ethnic conflict in Bhutan also generated high refugee numbers in the early 1990s. But it is not just in figures that the situations then and today are similar but also in terms of the nature of the debate. In the early 1990s, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) observed 'a less hospitable climate facing refugees in many asylum countries', 'a more general sense of weariness at the apparent intractability of refugee problems' and that most countries were increasingly adopting 'a more restrictive definition of what constitutes persecution'<sup>47</sup>.

**Flight as a response to conflict**

Forced migration is often the result of wars and civil wars. Flight can be a response to conflicts, violence, the perception of violence or a general absence of security. The same applies to political instability, human rights violations and threats to personal safety. These factors lie outside the economic domain but correlate with it, e.g. with respect to income and

**Figure 6: Interaction between drivers of migration**



Source: Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change (2011), Final Project Report, The Government Office for Science, London.

employment security.<sup>48</sup>

Different causes are associated with differences in the extent of forced displacement and migration, whether it be general violence as opposed to human rights violations, civil wars with and without external military intervention, or ethnic rebellion. The originators of violence and the form and duration of conflict have also been studied for their impacts on international and internal migration. But it is difficult to generalise the findings of the analysis because they are heavily dependent on context.<sup>49</sup>

### **Climate change and environmental disasters as drivers of displacement**

People also flee from natural disasters and the impacts of climate change. Under international conventions, persons who have to flee their home because of violence, human rights violations, natural or anthropogenic disasters are recognised as internally displaced persons.<sup>50</sup> Those who flee from natural disasters may not be granted refugee status when they cross a national border. The reason is that their decision to migrate lacks the aspect of persecution to be classified as refugees in the meaning of the UNHCR.<sup>51</sup>

Estimates on the number of people expected to live outside their country in future as a result of climate change and environmental disasters vary greatly.<sup>52</sup> Since 2008, however, each year an average 24.6 million people have been newly displaced by environmental disasters. That is more than those who have been forced to leave the home because of conflict and violence.<sup>53</sup> In many cases, however, they are evacuated only temporarily. Climate changes, on the other hand, develop over a long period of time and are reflected in droughts, flooding and rising sea levels, for example. The migratory movements they trigger are not only the result of direct effects of climate change but also of its interaction with economic, social and political drivers of migration.

People do not only leave vulnerable areas but also migrate to them, for example to coastal cities. The need to abandon affected areas is expected to grow as a result of the effects of climate change. But at the same time, the same effects can reduce the individual resources that are needed for migration. In the latter case, migration is hampered.<sup>54</sup> High vulnerability to climate change and reduced ability to migrate can generate trapped populations.<sup>55</sup> The correlation between environmental and climate changes, options for income diversification and mobility therefore merits attention.<sup>56</sup>

### **Knowledge of the causes of migration is limited**

Whether or not to migrate is a decision that every adult makes for themselves – sometimes together with other members of the household family. A wide range of economic and non-economic factors play a role. Present-day knowledge is insufficient to identify whether and which factors dominate the decision to migrate. In any case, reducing the causes of migration to income differences between countries alone falls short of the mark. That would mean, for example, that significantly more workers would migrate between the least developed economies and industrialised countries.<sup>57</sup>

Overall, there is no general migration theory that could be empirically tested. A broad range of sub-aspects with varying priorities is analysed where the main focus is on destination countries and possible economic explanations.<sup>58</sup> Apart from labour migration and forced displacement, migration motives include family reunification and raising children, marriage, education (student exchange), residency in retirement, skilled migration as well as environmentally and climate-induced migration.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, economists are more inclined to study the characteristics of migrants and the consequences of migration in the country of origin and destination than the causes. Migration motives can be broken down at least at micro-, meso- and macro-level (see Figure 6) but in the following we will focus on macro-economic structural transformations and how they relate to migration.

### **Migration and level of development**

#### **More migration is to be expected as a result of low-income countries' economic development**

Over time, assessments of the correlation between migration and development of national economies oscillate between optimism and pessimism.<sup>60</sup> Until into the first half of the 1970s, optimism prevailed, followed by a pessimistic assessment – under the buzzwords of brain drain and dependency – until the early 1990s. Currently the positive view predominates again, with a strong interest in topics such as brain gain, remittances and diasporas, as well as their possible use as development instruments. The complex relationship between migration and development suggests that migration does not unilaterally shape development or vice versa. Rather, an interdependent relationship exists between the two.

The pre-requisites and conditions for individual migration decisions change as a national economy develops. This shapes typical migratory movements at aggregate level. Social and economic development can awaken the desire to emigrate and put people in a

position to fulfil that desire.<sup>61</sup> As the development level increases, so does the skill level of the working-age population and, hence, the propensity to emigrate.<sup>62</sup> In the interplay between changing opportunities and incentives for migration, as well as barriers to it, including those from the countries' emigration and immigration policy, a non-linear correlation between migration and development emerges.

A comparison of countries illustrates that – starting from a low level of development – both the ratio of emigration to population and net emigration as the difference between outward and inward migration usually turn out greater the higher a country's average per-capita income is. This applies until the upper-middle per-capita income range of around 6,000 to 8,000 real purchasing power parity dollars (PPP dollars) is reached.<sup>63</sup> Above that level, migration tends to be lower the higher the average per-capita income is.

Even if some are questioning this mechanism,<sup>64</sup> a consensus has emerged – by applying the cross-sectional finding to the time dimension – that as a country's level of development rises, so does, initially, emigration. Assuming realistic growth rates, however, a country with low per-capita income will take a long time, usually several generations, to achieve a level of development from which emigration starts to decline again. Accordingly, the evidence provided of a correlation between income and emigration is not consistent because the periods studied are potentially too short. This inverted U-shaped pattern of emigration over the course of long-term development is referred to as migration transition, while a more short-term migration increase, for example as a result of trade liberalisation, is known as a migration hump.


Roughly one third of the world's countries still remain more or less below the threshold for a turnaround in migration behaviour (Figure 7). Even if not every country undergoes a migration transition one-to-one, countries with very low per-capita income can also be expected to experience rising emigration when per capita income increases. This affects very small countries, such as São Tomé and Príncipe or Comoros, but also populous states such as India and Pakistan, which together account for about 40% of the world's population.<sup>65</sup>

As countries develop, they become increasingly attractive as immigration destinations and bring in labour from other countries as well.<sup>66</sup> This trend counteracts emigration. When they are on a low level of development, emigration usually exceeds immigration. As a country grows more prosperous,

pressure to emigrate decreases and immigration rises so that a net emigration country may turn into a net immigration country (see Figure 8).

**Figure 7: GDP per capita**

Real GDP per capita (in thousand real PPP US dollars).




Real GDP per capita based on real GDP in interconnected purchasing power parities.

Source: Penn World Tables<sup>67</sup>, own calculations.

Maximum emigration is usually reached at a lower level of development (measured as BIP per capita) than the reversal from an emigration to an immigration country. When we compare real GDP per capita and net migration rates, it is evident that countries with a GDP per capita of less than 11,500 real international dollars are on average net emigration countries. Countries with a GDP per capita above this threshold are on average immigration countries (Figure 9). At the same time, there is considerable heterogeneity in this context as well. A substantial number of countries are also net emigration countries beyond the GDP-per-capita threshold mentioned.


**Figure 8: Stylised migration transition**



Source: de Haas, 2010.

The transition from a net emigration to a net immigration country is not a deterministic and irreversible process. Between 1960 and 2010, 46 countries underwent this transition. But at the same time, 70 immigration countries reverted to being emigration countries.<sup>68</sup> The same applies, for example, to some Latin American countries which have experienced less immigration from Europe and lost prosperity.

**Figure 9: Migration transition in a country comparison**



Net migration rate: Number of immigrants minus number of emigrants over a period divided by the number of person-years which the inhabitants of the host country have lived during that period. Real GDP per capita based on real GDP in chained purchasing power parities.

Source: Penn World Tables<sup>69</sup>, UN; own calculations.


The fact that it is primarily high-per-capita income countries that are net immigration countries thus determines the geographic distribution of net migration rates across the world (see Figure 10). High-income countries and, thus, industrialised countries on the northern hemisphere in particular experience net immigration. But immigration also exceeds emigration in South Africa, Australia and the high-income countries in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, the list of net emigration countries is topped by Syria, as refugee movements here overlap the context of net migration and the country's level of economic development.

The countries in Europe that have the highest net emigration rates are Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Latvia. They are also among the top 15 countries in international comparison, although Lithuania and Latvia at least count among the high-income countries. Consequently, they should already be far more advanced in their migration transition and, hence, experience less emigration and more immigration. This basic pattern, however, has been masked in both countries by their accession to the European Union and, in particular, the negative economic effects of the global financial and economic

crisis of 2008/2009.<sup>70</sup> This demonstrates very clearly that the level of economic development is only one dimension that plays a role in the scope and structure of international migration.

**Figure 10: Net migration rates**

Number of immigrants minus number of emigrants per thousand inhabitants, 2010 to 2015



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision.

**Migration transition and demographic transition  
Young population as migration potential**

Although a comprehensive database is lacking, the available findings indicate that people who migrate tend to be younger.<sup>71</sup> This is shown by immigration and emigration data for European countries<sup>72</sup> and analyses of global net migration movements<sup>73</sup>. The expectation that emigration is worthwhile as measured in terms of lifetime income is higher for younger than for older persons because their working life is potentially longer. At the same time, they must also mobilise resources to fund their migration, which is likely to be more challenging for younger persons.

In a similar way as migration transition, population growth initially increases as a country's level of development rises and then drops again (demographic transition, see also Box 4).<sup>74</sup> This process began around 1800 in Europe and has not yet come to an end in today's industrialised countries either. That will not happen until the population stops ageing.<sup>75</sup> In present-day developing countries, the process is evolving faster than in present-day industrialised countries.<sup>76</sup>

When we apply this longitudinal analysis to the cross section, countries with a low level of development should have higher population growth rates than countries with a high level of development. For that to be the case, however, the less-developed countries should already be in the demographic transition but still less advanced than the industrialised countries. Indeed, we can identify a pattern in the demographic development in the cross section when we classify countries by per-capita income (see Figure 11). At

2.8% annually, low-income countries have the highest average population growth, while high-income countries have the lowest, at 1.1%.

**Box 4: Economic development and life expectancy**

Economic development and higher income goes hand-in-hand with rising life expectancy (Preston curve<sup>77</sup>). Low per-capita income countries experience the highest increase in life expectancy. The correlation is weaker for countries with high per-capita income. Over time, however, life expectancy has risen across the globe for countries of all income levels.<sup>78</sup> Overall advances in medicine are the main contributor to this outcome. At the same time, it is quite possible that income is a reflection of the general level of development and has indirect effects, such as rising levels of education. The direct effects of higher income levels on health result from improved nutrition, access to clean drinking water and sanitation and medical care. The decline in mortality is typically seen as the result of a combination of these factors.<sup>79</sup>


With the demographic transition, the age structure of the population changes as well. When a population grows faster as a result of lower infant mortality, it becomes younger. What is economically relevant is that the share of the working-age population grows and is available to the labour market for a longer period of time. This also leads to a decline in the number of children and aged in relation to the working-age population between 15 and 64 years (dependency ratio). While the dependency ratio is growing in the majority of high-income countries, low and lower-middle income countries in particular, according to UN forecasts, can expect their dependency ratios to continue falling. The low-income countries in particular will not reach their minimum before the end of the forecast period 2050 (see Figure 12).

Population growth and population age structure are distributed unevenly across the globe (see Figure 13). While the population in Africa and the Middle East in particular is growing faster than in any other region, the dependency ratio in the countries south of the Sahara

is relatively high. What pushes the dependency ratio up in these countries is the high number of children.<sup>80</sup> The migration potential in these countries can therefore be expected to increase further. By comparison, the large emerging economies Russia, China, Brazil and, to a somewhat lesser extent, India and South Africa currently have a favourable ratio of working-age population to children and aged.

**Figure 11: Population growth and level of development**


Average 2011 to 2014. Country grouping according to the World Bank.



Source: Penn World Tables, own calculations.

**Figure 12: Demographic dividend**

Number of countries that reach their minimum dependency ratio in the respective year



Source: UNCTAD, own calculations.

The demographic transition cannot be used as a direct explanation for the migration transition. There are indications that the correlation between population growth and migration is at least not linear.<sup>81</sup> Countries with a young and fast-growing population, however, have a larger pool of persons who can migrate across borders. For that potential to be realised, however, further factors such as economic structural change and labour market changes must come into play.

Conversely, this line of reasoning also applies to the demographic dividend. The positive effects of a young, growing population on economic growth can be substantial.<sup>82</sup> In order to actually reap the demographic dividend, the labour market must be absorptive so that labour is or can be used productively. If this is not the case, not only do growth effects fail to occur but the opportunity costs of emigrating are lower as well.

**Migration transition and structural change**  
**Industrialisation and urbanisation are changing the conditions for migration**

High population growth and a young population alone are not sufficient drivers of migration. Rather, what changes migration activity is the interplay of population growth and economic structural changes in the course of a country's development. It is precisely this interplay that determines employment opportunities in the various sectors of an economy, as well as the economic and social environment that influences individual migration decisions. In this process, industrialisation – and urbanisation – is associated primarily with urban-rural migration.<sup>83</sup> But it also affects cross-border migration. International migrants typically aim for a city, usually a large one.<sup>84</sup>

Structural change alters the sectoral composition of an economy. This is reflected in the contribution of the sectors to value added and employment. The industrial sector and manufacturing, as part of it, merit particular attention here. Initially, manufacturing grows in

significance at the expense of the primary sector before it is forced to surrender value added and employment shares to the services sector.

For migration, shifts in labour demand as a result of structural change are pivotal. First, workers are made redundant in agriculture, which becomes more intensive and requires less labour. At the same time, as jobs become more scarce, the opportunity costs of migration decrease for rural inhabitants. These often migrate to the production facilities within the country, although they may also migrate to another country. International migration can be intensified particularly if industrialisation is accompanied by trade liberalisation (see also Box 5).<sup>85</sup>


**Box 5: Structural changes to the economic model and international migration**

Apart from industrialisation, other structural adjustments to the economic model can also alter international migration. These include abandoning import substitution and opening the economy to international trade and direct investment, as in the case of Mexico, for example, combined with the possibility of privatising communally held land.<sup>86</sup> Another example is Poland, which has transitioned from a centrally planned economy to a market economy.<sup>87</sup> But the transformation in Poland had a stronger shock effect on migration probability because the changes to the economic model were also more profound than in Mexico.


At the same time, industrialisation generates demand for labour, which acts as a magnet for international migration. The international division of labour creates a segmented labour market in the (new) industrialised countries in which local workers tend to receive secure and well-paid jobs in the primary labour market. Migrants, in turn, work primarily in the secondary labour market and services sector which pays lower wages, requires fewer skills and competencies and provides

**Figure 13: Demographic change from a global perspective**

Population growth in per cent, average 2010–2015



Demographic dividend as 1/dependency ratio



Source: UNCTAD, own calculations.

less security.<sup>88</sup> Despite the gap in human capital and school education, productivity, income and labour market participation between developing and OECD countries, the labour market participation and educational levels of immigrants are quite similar to those of the host country.<sup>89</sup> This is indicative of a self-selection process among immigrants.

However, today's developing and emerging countries no longer witness the typical structural transformation experienced by today's industrialised countries (see Box 6 for their historic experience). Rather, the following patterns can be identified, with Sub-Saharan Africa being seen as the only region with potential for substantial industrialisation (see Table 2).<sup>90</sup>

- Countries whose industrialisation process is converging with industrialised countries are found primarily in East Asia. The textbook example is South Korea.
- The industrialisation process has been found to have stagnated in at least 30 countries. Examples include India, Mexico, Indonesia and Thailand.
- Countries with premature deindustrialisation have been identified mainly in Latin America. The maximum share of industrial activity in these countries' economic output turns out to be less than that of today's industrialised countries and is reached sooner in the development process.<sup>91</sup> Nor does the maximum employment share reach the levels of today's industrialised countries.

#### Box 6: Europe's migration experience during industrialisation

Even in today's industrialised countries, industrialisation was not simply accompanied by increased migration into the cities. Rather, the patterns of urbanisation, mobility and migration were much more complex.<sup>92</sup> Overall, industrialisation is accompanied by very high overall mobility. The changes in migration patterns since the 17th century originated in the broad changes in land ownership, employment demand, demographic patterns and investment locations.<sup>93</sup> In addition to employment opportunities in the budding industrial sector, the emergence of nation-states also provided more employment opportunities in cities, for example in government services, the postal service and education. Interdependencies also existed between internal and international migration.

**Table 2: Employment in the industrial sector**

Percentage share in total employment

	1970	1980	1990	2000 to 2007	2010 to 2014	
Industrialised countries	37	35	31	27	24	—
North Africa	19	25	27	24	29	—
Sub-Saharan Africa	10	13	14	13	16	—
Latin America and Caribbean	24	25	25	22	21	—
East Asia	18	30	35	28	25	—
South-East Asia	15	20	22	24	22	—
South Asia	13	14	17	20	23	—
Western Asia	18	23	23	23	25	—
Transition countries			30	18	23	—

Source: UNCTAD (2016), Trade and Development Report.

In the structural transformation, the services sector is therefore a crucial factor for the current and future migration potential of developing countries. When this sector is equally capable as the industrial sector of absorbing workers and generating income, there is less pressure to emigrate than when this is not the case. However, there is little to suggest that the services sector can play an independent role in structural change. So although domains such as hospitality and nursing services can absorb workers, their contribution to general productivity growth is low. Furthermore, in countries where industrialisation is no longer advancing, the relative growth in employment in the services sector reflects generally insufficient employment creation.<sup>94</sup>

So despite all the heterogeneity within the sector, the services sector supports structural change rather than driving it. But it can hardly replace a dynamic industrial sector with its associated productivity advances and income growth.<sup>95</sup> This has two opposing implications for migration. On the one hand, the services sector creates jobs too, even if structural change no longer advances. This reduces the potential for migration. On the other hand, stagnating industrialisation or premature deindustrialisation prevents incomes from growing and GDP per capita from catching up with industrialised countries. Particularly in combination with a young and fast-growing population, this increases the potential for migration.

### Migration as a way of safeguarding income


In less-developed economies, low savings ratios and typically underdeveloped and informal financial markets make it difficult for households to smooth their incomes by saving and borrowing and to make provisions for risks. Migration is one way of reducing income insecurities at household level and overcoming credit restrictions. But those who emigrate must be willing and able to make remittances back home.

Even if they seek to emigrate with the aim of overcoming credit restrictions, these very credit restrictions may make migration impossible. After all, prospective migrants must pay the costs of emigrating. Empirical evidence shows that credit restrictions can be a barrier to international migration.<sup>96</sup>

Migration can be a way not just to overcome credit and other financial market restrictions such as lack of crop insurance schemes. Rather, it can also be a substitute for other forms of unavailable risk insurance such as unemployment or social insurance.<sup>97</sup> Income diversification through migration then reduces the vulnerability of household income to environmental and economic risks.<sup>98</sup>

### Figure 14: Volatility of real GDP per capita

Variation coefficient over 6 years



Source: Barro and Ursua, Macroeconomic Data, 2010, [scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/barro-ursua-macroeconomic-data](http://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/barro-ursua-macroeconomic-data), own calculations.

Particularly in emerging economies, business cycles are more pronounced than in industrialised countries, as illustrated by the volatility of per capita GDP in the past 40 years (see Figure 14). Real gross domestic product, private consumption and investment fluctuate more strongly.<sup>99</sup> Real consumption of private households in emerging economies actually fluctuates more strongly across the business cycle than real gross domestic product. That makes options for income

diversification, including the option of migrating, all the more important for developing and emerging economies. When income and consumption variations decrease with rising levels of development and more opportunities arise to protect incomes through the financial system or even social security, for example, that reduces the need to emigrate as well.

### Inequality within and between countries as a major determinant of migration

Like migration, inequality is a complex concept that can be studied for a particular country, in a cross-country comparison or globally at the level of the individual. It can refer to wealth or income, market income or income after taxes and transfers. For this reason alone it is unrealistic to expect a simple and easily proven correlation between inequality and migration.

Nevertheless, income differences and inequality play a crucial role in explaining migration.

### Inequality between countries as a cause of migration

Income and expected wage differentials at individual level between the country of origin and destination particularly play a role in explaining migration in the context of neoclassical theory. Here it is assumed that people make a rational decision for or against migration on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis.<sup>100</sup> The benefit is then measured by the expected lifetime income.<sup>101</sup> If living standards in developing and industrial countries fail to converge, the incentives to migrate because of global inequality in income distribution will remain.<sup>102</sup>

Developing countries have plenty of scope to catch up with industrialised countries. In 1960 the ratio of average real GDP per capita of the top 10 per cent of countries to the bottom 10 per cent was less than 20. By 1990 the factor had increased to 40 and has exceeded 50 since the turn of the millennium.<sup>103</sup> In around 90% of developing and emerging economies, real GDP per capita (in purchasing power parities) is less than half that of the US.


Experience shows that the gap in GDP per capita does not decrease in a steady process that runs more or less automatically.<sup>104</sup> Rather, catching-up phases are interrupted by episodes in which the gap remains the same or even widens, particularly for specific countries. The World Bank predicts that in the years ahead the per-capita growth rate in around one third of developing and emerging economies will not be sufficient to reduce the gap to the industrialised countries.<sup>105</sup>

### Inequality within countries is an incentive for migration


Higher income inequality within countries is accompanied by greater relative disadvantage, increasing the likelihood of a decision to emigrate.<sup>106</sup> At the same time, the absolute poor hardly have the means for international migration. But poverty reduction can raise or intensify migration aspirations in the first place. So the focus is placed more strongly on which persons – identified through their position in income distribution – (have the means to) migrate,<sup>107</sup> although studies also show that higher inequality in a country can be accompanied by lower migration.<sup>108</sup>

#### Figure 15: GDP per capita

Real GDP per capita in real purchasing power parities, 1970



Real GDP per capita in real purchasing power parities, 2014



Source: PENN World Tables.<sup>109</sup>

There is no evidence of a stylised fact in which inequality<sup>110</sup> initially increases with a country's level of development and then decreases again. The drop in inequality at higher stages of development, above all, is less substantiated.<sup>111</sup> Especially in industrialised countries, inequality fell until the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century but has risen again since then.<sup>112</sup> This pattern is particularly pronounced in the US. No general inequality trend can be observed for developing and emerging economies. This is due to a wide range of different regional and country-specific developments.

For the interplay of inequality and migration in the course of the development of national economies, the crucial factor then is how inequality changes within a country in which per-capita incomes are rising and how strong the relevant effects on migration are. This is

because not all members of society will benefit equally when average incomes increase as the level of development rises.<sup>113</sup>

#### Regional focus: Sub-Saharan Africa

From a European perspective, the focus is currently shifting from refugee inflows to labour migration from Africa to Europe. Other types of migration and migratory movements within African regions are receiving less attention. But trade, marriage, education and status are also reasons for migration, as in the rest of the world.<sup>114</sup> In regard to the long-term structural and economic causes for international migration explored above, Sub-Saharan Africa often comes to mind, whether in terms of its per capita income, demographic trends or level of industrialisation. These indicators often point to further migration potential in Africa.

#### Box 7: Challenges of measuring international migration in Africa

As recently as in 2005, it was asserted that emigration from Africa was low in relation to (international) wage differentials.<sup>115</sup> That may have been due to problems of measurement, the immigration policy of OECD countries or lack of resources for migration. The fact is that there is no evidence of lower mobility per se in Africa. In the past decade, researchers have identified stronger and more complex migratory movements to and within Africa.<sup>116</sup> That, however, may also be due to an improved database. But despite progress, the data material remains limited as a result of lacking or outdated census counts, surveys and administrative data, for example. The fundamental problem of capturing data is exacerbated by the lack of financial and technical resources for controlling borders, long and unmanageable national borders as well as ethnic links across national boundaries.<sup>117</sup> Accordingly, few internationally available studies deal with migration in Africa.

Even if low per-capita income countries are concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, the differences in the level of development of African economies are still high. Major differences in migration can therefore be expected as well. In order to illustrate this, we will take a closer look at two African countries that have roughly the same real income per capita. The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic have the lowest GDP per capita. At the upper end of the income scale are Mauritius and Equatorial Guinea, which are also above the global average.<sup>118</sup> Despite the similar incomes per capita of the DR Congo and the Central African Republic and the relatively high incomes per capita of the other two countries, both

pairs of countries have very different net migration rates (see Table 3). While inward and outward migration are roughly even in the DR Congo, the number of persons emigrating from the Central African Republic far outnumbers its immigrants. Whereas Equatorial Guinea experiences net immigration, emigration dominates in Mauritius as well. A more in-depth analysis of the underlying conditions is therefore useful in order to illustrate the complexity of the migration patterns.

**Table 3: Comparison of African countries**

	DR Congo	Central African Republic	Equatorial Guinea	Mauritius
Migrants	7.1	16.7	12.8	22.5
Net migration	0.0	-17.6	16.9	-1.9
Refugees in the country	5.8	2.7	0.0	0.0
Refugees from the country	7.9	109.1	0.2	0.2
Internally displaced	28.4	89.6	-	-
GDP per capita	1.217	594	40.133	17.942
Population	78,736,153	4,594,621	1,221,490	1,263,473
Population growth	3.3	0.5	4.3	0.2
Demographic Dividend	0.010	0.011	0.015	0.024
Urban population	43.5	40.6	40.3	39.4
Share of agriculture	21.9	48.9	1.3	3.9
Share of manufacturing	17.5	7.3	13.2	15.5
Access to bank account	25.8	13.7	-	89.8

**Global comparison**

1st quantile	2nd quantile	3rd quantile	4th quantile	5th quantile
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Notes: Migrants (as persons living in the country), net migration, refugees, internally displaced persons and urban population each as a share of the population; real GDP per capita based on real GDP in chained purchasing power parities, access to a banking account as a percentage of adults (persons over the age of 15), average share of agriculture and average share of manufacturing in value creation from 2010 to 2015.

Sources: UN, UNHCR, PENN World Tables, WDI, own calculations.

With the exception of Mauritius, the three countries are situated in Central and West Africa, where a large portion of international migration within the region takes place. Conflict and instability are major drivers of migration there.<sup>119</sup> As the example of the DR Congo shows, the countries are often both origin and destination for refugees.<sup>120</sup> While some 537,000 refugees were in the country at the end of 2017, around 620,000 persons had fled the DR Congo. In addition there are more than 4 million internally displaced persons. But international migration is not restricted to refugees alone. Labour migration is another movement, for example from the Central African Republic to Gabon, which attracts workers to its booming oil and timber industry.

**Democratic Republic of Congo:**

**From an immigration to an emigration country**

The DR Congo has evolved from an immigration country to an emigration country since 1960. Initially, the DR Congo was an immigration country. Its economy developed quite successfully at the time. At the beginning of the 1970s it reached its highest per capita GDP in real terms, twice as high as in 2014 and nearly 8 times as high as in 2009.<sup>121</sup> Political and economic crises and wars followed, particularly since the early 1990s.

Although it is one of the most populous countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and rich in resources, the DR Congo is one of the world's least developed countries.<sup>122</sup> It experienced net emigration for the first time in the early 1980s. This has been consistently the case since the latter half of the 1990s. Meanwhile, emigration is a socially accepted strategy for escaping violence and lack of economic prospects.<sup>123</sup> And at the same time, new opportunities emerged in the destination countries, which even intensified emigration. These include the end of apartheid in South Africa and the end of the civil war in Angola, combined with dynamic economic development. The negative economic and political development made the DR Congo less attractive to immigrants. Traditionally, these came from Africa, particularly from Senegal, Mali and Nigeria. Since 2001, rising numbers of immigrants from Asia (Lebanon, India, China) have been recorded<sup>124</sup> as a result of the booming mining sector.

With the increased emigration resulting from deteriorating economic and social conditions, the composition of migrants moving to destination countries outside Africa has changed, especially since the 1990s.<sup>125</sup> They include a higher share of women and less educated persons, more refugees and asylum-seekers. Emigration for the purpose of pursuing an education has been replaced by emigration as a crisis-response strategy, which has lowered emigrants' level of education. What also plays a role is that the number of scholarships in Europe has decreased. But a larger diaspora and the formation of migrant networks are also likely to have reduced migration costs, which has corresponding effects on the composition of emigrants. At the same time, there are fewer returnees because of the situation in the DR Congo and as a result of a more restrictive immigration policy in Europe.<sup>126</sup>

**Central African Republic:****Weak data situation, flight and forced displacement predominate**

According to the World Bank's Human Development Index<sup>127</sup>, the Central African Republic – despite being rich in resources – is the world's second least developed country after Niger. It also has more refugees and internally displaced persons as a population percentage than its neighbouring country, DR Congo. Emigration clearly exceeds immigration. At the same time, hardly any information is available about population movements. Even the paltry data available was destroyed during the conflicts.<sup>128</sup>

The current spiral of violence fuelled by fighting between competing militia, especially since 2013, has led to a humanitarian crisis, so that migration is dominated by flight and forced displacement. In general, the country has never attracted many immigrants because of widespread violence and poor economic development. But between 1993 and 2013 it experienced increased immigration from other central African states as the procedure for working visa was simplified.<sup>129</sup> In addition, international migration is taking place particularly to France, reflecting its history as a former colony.

**Equatorial Guinea:****Still a destination country for labour migrants**

On paper, Equatorial Guinea is a parliamentary democracy but de facto it is under authoritarian rule. The Democracy Index 2017 of the EIU puts Equatorial Guinea in 161st place in 167 countries.<sup>130</sup> Even though its real per capita income is around three quarters of that of Germany,<sup>131</sup> the country ranks only 141st out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index due to its low levels of education and life expectancy. The poverty index is also just slightly lower than the Sub-Saharan African average.<sup>132</sup> The potential of rich oil deposits does not translate into inclusive growth.

Very sparse information is available on population as well as outward and inward migration numbers. The last reliable census took place in 1960<sup>133</sup> and none of the subsequent figures met the corresponding standard. It can be concluded from the scarce information that immigration – especially labour immigration – has taken place from the mid-19th-century until today.<sup>134</sup> During the colonial period it was primarily African workers who came with an employment contract and left the country again when it ended. The oil boom since the mid-1990s has led to labour migration that followed the same pattern, particularly from Europe, Asia and North America, because the oil and natural gas industry relies on skilled labourers. The only university (National University of Equatorial

Guinea), however, was not founded until 1995. Before then, people had to go abroad for tertiary education. At the same time, the two dictatorships that have ruled the country since 1969 have led to flight and expulsion of both nationals and foreigners.<sup>135</sup>

**Mauritius:****Environmental refugees and promotion of circular migration**

Although it has a lower per capita income than Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius is reported to have a significantly higher level of development, according to the Human Development Index. It also has a fully fledged democracy. As the country did not have any indigenous inhabitants, its population is composed exclusively of immigrants and their descendants. In spite of its level of development, Mauritius is experiencing net outward migration. Two international migration topics are of particular relevance to Mauritius.

First, Mauritius is one of the 15 countries most vulnerable to natural hazards, mostly in the form of rising sea levels, cyclones and flooding.<sup>136</sup> Other risks of disaster come from rainfall, storms, humidity and rising temperatures. Mauritius was therefore one of six countries which participated in a migration, environment and climate change pilot project between January 2014 and March 2017 (Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy, MECLEP).<sup>137</sup> The aim was to formulate possible courses of political action on how migration can support environmental and climate change adaptation strategies. In addition to research and knowledge sharing, the project also supported capacity building.<sup>138</sup>

Second, Mauritius is seeking to benefit from circular labour migration and its extensive diaspora for its socio-economic development. Agreements on circular migration were concluded with France and Italy as well as with Canada between 2008 and 2014. Their purpose was to reduce unemployment in the country while encouraging worker remittances. They also encourage returnees to set up small or medium-sized businesses or make other investments. However, some are critical of circular labour migration and challenge, above all, the assumption of a 'triple-win' situation for migrants, their country of origin and the host country.<sup>139</sup>

**Conclusion**

Migration and development are inextricably linked. When a country is on a low level of development, emigration usually increases as the country develops further, before stagnating and then decreasing. But even developed economies experience emigration. For example, Germany is said to have evolved from an

emigration to an immigration nation – as have Ireland, Italy and Spain.<sup>140</sup> But that does not mean there is just immigration and no more emigration.

Long-term developments and structural changes determine the basic patterns of international migration. Based on structural transformations associated with advancing economic development, links can be established between migration and demographic change, migration and industrialisation and urbanisation, migration and fluctuations in economic

activity, and migration and inequality. These developments overlap and thus generate migration that evolves over time. There are other facets of migration as well, such as the consequences for the labour market in the country of origin and destination, responses of migration policy, the significance of migration networks and the importance of home remittances for countries of origin. These facets then determine not just the extent of migratory movements but also the extent of bilateral migration between countries and the interaction between migration and economic development. ■

<sup>1</sup> Pohl, C. (2007), EU-Osterweiterung und Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit: Erfahrungen aus Großbritannien und Implikationen für Deutschland (*EU enlargement to the east and free movement of labour: experiences from the United Kingdom and implications for Germany* – our title translation, in German only), ifo Dresden berichtet 5/2007, 38–44.

Bug, A. (2011), Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit nach der Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union: Chancen und Risiken für den Arbeitsmarkt (*Free movement of labour after the European Union's enlargement to the east: opportunities and risks for the labour market* – our title translation, in German only), Deutscher Bundestag Infobrief, WD 6 – 3010 – 001/11.

Fassmann, H. and Münz, R. (2003), Auswirkungen der EU-Erweiterung auf die Ost-West-Wanderung (*Impacts of EU enlargement on East-West migration* – our title translation, in German only), WSI Mitteilungen 1, 25–32.

<sup>2</sup> Article 13.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets forth: 'Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.' Federal Agency for Civic Education, Dossier Migration, Gibt es ein Recht auf Migration? (*Is there a right to migration* – our title translation, in German only), [www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-migration/](http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-migration/)

<sup>3</sup> [www.mediendienst-integration.de](http://www.mediendienst-integration.de)  
In German language two different terms are used for immigrants: immigrants as all persons coming to Germany (Einwanderer) and immigrants as persons coming to Germany with the intention to stay (Zuwanderer).

<sup>4</sup> Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 – EU statistics on migration and international protection, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3AI14508>

<sup>5</sup> IOM (2017), World Migration Report 2018.

<sup>6</sup> De Beer, J., Raymer, J., van der Erf, R. and van Wissen, L. (2010), Overcoming the Problems of Inconsistent International Migration data: A New Method Applied to Flows in Europe, *European Journal of Population* 26 (4), 459–481, <https://doi:10.1007/s10680-010-9220-z>.

<sup>7</sup> The growing numbers of tourists would also have to be taken into account. While tourist arrivals totalled 435 million in 1990, that figure rose to around 1.3 billion in 2017. What is counted is not the number of tourists as persons but the number of arrivals with at least one overnight stay in the host country. When tourists overstay their visas and fail to officially change their status, they become irregular migrants. Even if that affects only a small portion of tourists, substantial migration can still be assumed when tourist numbers are high.

Skeldon, R. (2017), International Migration, Internal Migration, Mobility and Urbanization: Towards More Integrated Approaches, United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Sustainable Cities, Human Mobility and International Migration, UN/POP/EGM/2017/7.

UNWTO (2018), UNWTO Highlights Confirm Another Record Year in 2017, Press release PR No. 18062.

[www2.unwto.org/press-release/2018-08-27/unwto-highlights-confirm-another-record-year-2017](http://www2.unwto.org/press-release/2018-08-27/unwto-highlights-confirm-another-record-year-2017)

<sup>8</sup> Skeldon, R. (2017), International Migration, Internal Migration, Mobility and Urbanization: Towards More Integrated Approaches, United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Sustainable Cities, Human Mobility and International Migration, UN/POP/EGM/2017/7.

Abramitzky, R. and Boustan, L. (2017), Immigration in American Economic History, *Journal of Economic Literature* 55 (4), 1311–1345.

For example, the share of persons who have left four Polish municipalities since 1980 to seek permanent residence in Germany is very low while the temporary migration is substantial.

Massey, D. S., Kalter, F. and Pren, K. A. (2008), Structural Economic Change and international Migration from Mexico and Poland, *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 60 (48), 134–161.

<sup>9</sup> Just one third of Mexicans who emigrated to the US between 2005 and 2010 had returned in the year 2010. Other estimates put that figure at only 4%. For Morocco, on the other hand, the share of returned migrants is a much lower 5%.

Wahba, J. (2015), Who benefits from return migration to developing countries?, *IZA World of Labor* 123, <https://doi:10.15185/izawol.123>.

<sup>10</sup> OECD (2008): International Migration Outlook.

<sup>11</sup> Wahba, J. (2015), Who benefits from return migration to developing countries? *IZA World of Labor* 123, <https://doi:10.15185/izawol.123>.

<sup>12</sup> De Beer, J., Raymer, J., van der Erf, R. and van Wissen, L. (2010), Overcoming the Problems of Inconsistent International Migration data: A New Method Applied to Flows in Europe, *European Journal of Population* 26 (4), 459–481, <https://doi:10.1007/s10680-010-9220-z>.

<sup>13</sup> Bundesmeldegesetz, [www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bmg/BJNR108410013.html](http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bmg/BJNR108410013.html)

<sup>14</sup> §54 Bundesmeldegesetz, [www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bmg/BJNR108410013.html](http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bmg/BJNR108410013.html)

<sup>15</sup> IOM (2017), World Migration Report 2018.

<sup>16</sup> Hatton, T. J. and Williamson, J. G. (2005), What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?, in: Borjas, G. J. and Crisp, J. (eds) *Poverty, International Migration and Asylum*, Studies in Development Economics and Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017), International Migration Report 2017: Highlights, ST/ESA/SER.A/404.

<sup>18</sup> Ferrie, J. P. and Hatton, T. (2015), Two Centuries of International Migration, in: Chiswick, B. R. and Miller, P. W., *Handbook of the Economics of International Migration*, Chapter 2, 53–88.

Dadush, U. and Shaw, W. (2012), Is the Labor Market Global, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, [carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/03/is-labor-market-global-pub-46388](http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/03/is-labor-market-global-pub-46388).

<sup>19</sup> Federal Agency for Civic Education, *Globale Migration in der Zukunft (Global migration in the future* – our title translation, in German only), Brief Dossier No. 23, September 2013.

<sup>20</sup> Own translation of Zelinsky, W. (1971), The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition, *Geographical Review*, 61 (2), 219–249, p. 225.

<sup>21</sup> IOM (2011), Glossary on Migration, 2nd edition, International Migration Law No. 25.

Older definitions were not as comprehensive. The term migrant usually referred to all persons who freely made the decision to migrate for reasons of 'personal benefit' and without being affected by an external compelling factor. It is therefore applied to persons and family members who moved to another country or region in order to improve their material or social conditions and prospects for themselves or their family.

<sup>22</sup> IOM (2011), Glossary on Migration, 2nd edition, International Migration Law No. 25.

<sup>23</sup> Dadush, U. and Shaw, W. (2012), Globalization, Labor Markets, and Inequality, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, [carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/02/globalization-labor-markets-and-inequality-pub-47028](http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/02/globalization-labor-markets-and-inequality-pub-47028).

More than 70% of migrants (as persons residing in a country) of working age are labour migrants.

IOM (2017), World Migration Report 2018, p. 28.

But here as well, there is an abundance of variations at detail level. Thus, in the year 2008 migration to 14 European countries from outside the EU was composed of 60% dependants seeking family reunification, 25% labour migrants and 15% refugees.

Ferrie, J. P. and Hatton, T. (2015), Two Centuries of International Migration, in: Chiswick, B. R. and Miller, P. W., Handbook of the Economics of International Migration, Chapter 2, 53–88.

<sup>24</sup> Basu, K. (2016), Globalization of Labor Markets and the Growth Prospects of Nations, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7590.

<sup>25</sup> Dadush, U. and Shaw, W. (2012), Is the Labor Market Global, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, [carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/03/is-labor-market-global-pub-46388](http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/03/is-labor-market-global-pub-46388)

<sup>26</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2016), International Migration Report 2015, ST/ESA/SER.A/384.

<sup>27</sup> In 2015 the UN estimated the number of international migrants at 244 million. By contrast, the UNDP conservatively estimated 740 million internal migrants around the world for the year 2000, applying the largest administrative units of the respective country for its definition.

Skeldon, R. (2017), International Migration, Internal Migration, Mobility and Urbanization: Towards More Integrated Approaches, United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Sustainable Cities, Human Mobility and International Migration, UN/POP/EGM/2017/7.

<sup>28</sup> Skeldon, R. (2017), International Migration, Internal Migration, Mobility and Urbanization: Towards More Integrated Approaches, United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Sustainable Cities, Human Mobility and International Migration, UN/POP/EGM/2017/7.

<sup>29</sup> Here the creation of new states poses a problem for the consistency of migration statistics. While international migration statistics captured only 135 states, territories and administrative regions in 1970, that figure had risen to 213 in 2015. See IOM (2017), World Migration Report 2018.

<sup>30</sup> Ferrie, J. P. and Hatton, T. (2015), Two Centuries of International Migration, in: Chiswick, B. R. and Miller, P. W., Handbook of the Economics of International Migration, Chapter 2, 53–88.

<sup>31</sup> Czaika, M. and de Haas, H. (2014), The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory? International Migration Review 48 (2), 283–323.

<sup>32</sup> Carling, J. and Talleraas, C. (2016), Root causes and drivers of migration: Implications for humanitarian efforts and development cooperation, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Paper.

Czaika, M. and de Haas, H. (2014), The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory?, International Migration Review 48 (2), 283–323.

<sup>33</sup> Espipova, N., Ray, J. and Pugliese, A. (2017), Number of Potential Migrants Worldwide Tops 700 Million, Gallup News, <http://news.gallup.com/poll/211883/number-potential-migrants-worldwide-tops-700-million.aspx>

<sup>34</sup> These standards are laid out in the Geneva Convention on Refugees of 1951 and the 1967 Additional Protocol of New York. <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-migration/>

<sup>35</sup> European Asylum Support Office (2016), The Push and Pull Factors of Asylum-Related Migration, A Literature Review.

<sup>36</sup> Duden, [www.duden.de/suchen/dudenonline/FI%C3%BCchtling](http://www.duden.de/suchen/dudenonline/FI%C3%BCchtling)

<sup>37</sup> 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention on Refugees) Art. 1(A) (2), amended by the Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967 (1967 Protocol).

<sup>38</sup> Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb) (2013): Dossier on Human Rights, [www.bpb.de/internationales/weltweit/menschenrechte/38809/fluechtlinge](http://www.bpb.de/internationales/weltweit/menschenrechte/38809/fluechtlinge)

<sup>39</sup> IOM (2011), Glossary on Migration, 2nd edition, International Migration Law No. 25.

<sup>40</sup> IOM (2011), Glossary on Migration, 2nd edition, International Migration Law No. 25.

<sup>41</sup> UNHCR (2017), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016.

<sup>42</sup> UNHCR (2017), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016.

<sup>43</sup> At the end of 2017, Columbia had the world's second-highest number of internally displaced persons – 6.5 million. Only Syria has more.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2018), Global Report on Internal Displacement, Genf.

<sup>44</sup> UNHCR (2018), Venezuela Situation, Fact Sheet June 2018.

<sup>45</sup> Because of the extraordinary situation, some destination countries have created specific mechanisms in addition to existing immigration rules to create a legal basis or provide protection, which is classified as 'other forms of protection or alternative legal status'.

UNHCR (2018), Venezuela Situation: Responding to the needs of people displaced from Venezuela, Supplementary Appeal, January–December 2018.

<sup>46</sup> Devictor, X. and Do, Q.-T. (2018), For refugees, the average duration of exile is going down. Why is this bad news?, World Bank Blog, [http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/refugees-average-duration-exile-going-down-why-bad-news?cid=ECR\\_E\\_NewsletterWeekly\\_EN\\_EXT&deliveryName=DM4658](http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/refugees-average-duration-exile-going-down-why-bad-news?cid=ECR_E_NewsletterWeekly_EN_EXT&deliveryName=DM4658).

<sup>47</sup> UNHCR (1993), The State of the World's Refugees 1993: The Challenge of Protection.

<sup>48</sup> European Asylum Support Office (2016), Significant Pull/Push Factors for Determining of Asylum-Related Migration: A Literature Review.

<sup>49</sup> European Asylum Support Office (2016), Significant Pull/Push Factors for Determining of Asylum-Related Migration: A Literature Review.

<sup>50</sup> UNHCR, Global Trends;

'Beyond conflict, generalized violence and disasters brought on by rapid-onset natural hazards, global figures on internal displacement do not capture the many other contexts in which people flee their homes, such as criminal violence, development projects and slow-onset crises related to drought and environmental change.'

IOM (2017), Migration and migrants: A global overview, in: IOM (2017) World Migration Report 2018, IOM: Geneva, footnote 39.

<sup>51</sup> UNHCR (2015): In photos: Climate change, disasters and displacement <http://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html>.

Global Forum on Migration and Development (2017), Thematic Recollection 2007–2017, prepared by the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) for the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, p. 38.

<sup>52</sup> Estimates range from 200 million to one billion.

Myers, N. (2005), Environmental refugees: an emerging security issue, Paper presented at the 13th Economic Forum, Prague, 23–27 May 2005.

Christian Aid (2007), Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis, Christian Aid Report, May, [www.christianaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-08/human-tide-the-real-migration-crisis-may-2007.pdf](http://www.christianaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-08/human-tide-the-real-migration-crisis-may-2007.pdf).

<sup>53</sup> The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2018), Global Report on Internal Displacement, Genf.

<sup>54</sup> Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change (2011), Final Project Report, The Government Office for Science, London.

Beine, M., Bertoli, S. and Moraga, J. F.-H. (2014), A practitioners' guide to gravity models of international migration, Documento de Trabajo 2014-03, fedea, point to the following overview articles:

Lilleor, H., and van den Broeck, K. (2011): Economic Drivers of Migration and Climate Change in LDCs, Global Environmental Change 21 (Supplement 1), S. 70–81.

Millock, K. (2015): Environmentally Induced Migration, Annual Reviews of Resource Economics. 7, 35-60, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-100814-125031>.

- <sup>55</sup> Black, R., Bennett, S. R. G., Thomas, S. M. and Beddington, J. R. (2011), Migration as adaptation, *Nature* 478, 447–449.
- <sup>56</sup> Tacoli, C. (2009), Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility, *Environment & Urbanization* 21 (2), 513–525, DOI: 10.1177/0956247809342182.
- <sup>57</sup> Lucas, R. E. B. (2008), International Labor Migration in a Globalizing Economy, *Carnegie Papers* No. 92, p. 15.
- <sup>58</sup> Ravlik, M. (2014), Determinants of International Migration: A Global Analysis, HSE Working papers WP BRP 52/SOC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- <sup>59</sup> King, R. (2012), Theories and Typologies of Migration: Overview and primer, *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations*, 3/12.
- <sup>60</sup> De Haas, H. (2010), Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective, *International Migration Review* 44 (81), 227–264.
- <sup>61</sup> De Haas, H. (2010), Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective, *International Migration Review* 44 (81), 227–264.
- <sup>62</sup> Dao, T. H., Docquier, F., Parsons, C. and Peri, G. (2016), Migration and Development: Dissecting the Anatomy of the Mobility Transition, *IZA Discussion Papers*, No. 10272.
- In addition, the abilities and skills associated with higher qualifications can also be more readily transferred to industrialised countries.
- Greenwood, M. J. and McDowell, J. M. (1992), The Macro Determinants of International Migration: A Survey, prepared for presentation at a conference sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Studies, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and the Institute for Future Studies on 'Mass Migration in Europe: Implications in East and West,' held in Vienna, Austria, March 5–7, 1992.
- <sup>63</sup> Clemens, M. A. (2014), Does development reduce migration?, in: R. E. B. Lucas, *International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development*, Chapter 6.
- <sup>64</sup> Lucas, R. E. B. (2005), *International Migration and Economic Development: Lessons from Low Income Countries*, Edward Elgar.
- <sup>65</sup> Dao et al. (2017) put that ratio at two thirds of the population but use an older version of the PENN World Tables for per-capita income, according to which China is still below the threshold of 6,000 real US dollars.
- Dao, T. H., Docquier, F., Parsons, C., and Peri, G. (2016), Migration and Development: Dissecting the Anatomy of the Mobility Transition, *IZA Discussion Papers*, No. 10272.
- <sup>66</sup> De Haas, H. (2010), Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective, *International Migration Review* 44 (81), 227–264.
- <sup>67</sup> Feenstra, R. C., Inklaar, R. and Timmer, M. P. (2015), 'The Next Generation of the Penn World Table' *American Economic Review*, 105(10), 3150–3182, available for download at [www.ggdc.net/pwt](http://www.ggdc.net/pwt)
- <sup>68</sup> Czaika, M. and H. de Haas (2014), The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory? *International Migration Review* 48 (2), 283–323.
- <sup>69</sup> Feenstra, R. C., Inklaar, R. and Timmer, M. P. (2015), 'The Next Generation of the Penn World Table' *American Economic Review*, 105(10), 3150–3182, available for download at [www.ggdc.net/pwt](http://www.ggdc.net/pwt)
- <sup>70</sup> The increase in registered emigration in Lithuania is also due to changes in the Lithuanian health insurance system. After the reform, emigrants who have failed to report their departure would continue to be required to pay health insurance premiums. Persons who had left Lithuania prior to 2010 therefore also registered their departure retroactively.
- Stratfor Worldview (2013), In the Baltics, Emigration and Demographic Decline, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/baltics-emigration-and-demographic-decline>
- <sup>71</sup> For migrants (as persons living in the country), on the other hand, it has been found that the mean age of migrants at global level is higher than that of the total population.
- UN (2013), *Population Facts* No. 2013/04.
- <sup>72</sup> Wiśniowski, A., Forster, J. J., Smith, P. W. F., Bijak, J. and Raymer, J. (2016), Integrated modelling of age and sex patterns of European migration, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A* 179, Part 4, 1007–1024.
- <sup>73</sup> Nawrotzki, R. J. and L. Jiang (2014), The Community Demographic Model International Migration (CDM-IM) Dataset: Generating Age and Gender Profiles of International Migration Flows, *NCAR Technical Note*, NCAR/TN-508+STR.
- <sup>74</sup> The prerequisite is that economic development initially leads to a decline in mortality from its high starting level before fertility drops as well, also from a high starting level. Population growth is low both at the beginning and at the end of the demographic transition process. For a critique, see:
- Guinnane, T. W. (2010), The historical fertility transition: A guide for economists, *Center Discussion Paper, Economic Growth Center*, No. 990, Yale Univ., Economic Growth Center, New Haven, Conn.
- <sup>75</sup> Lee, R. (2003), The Demographic Transition: Three Centuries of Fundamental Change, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17 (4), 167–190.
- <sup>76</sup> Lee, R. (2003), The Demographic Transition: Three Centuries of Fundamental Change, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17 (4), 167–190.
- <sup>77</sup> Preston, S. H. (1975), The Changing Relation between Mortality and Level of Economic Development, *Population Studies* 29 (2), 231–248.
- <sup>78</sup> Bloom, D. E. and Canning, D. (2007), Commentary: The Preston Curve 30 years on: still sparking fires, *International Journal of Epidemiology*, 36, 498–499, doi:10.1093/ije/dym079.
- <sup>79</sup> Guinnane, T. W. (2010), The historical fertility transition: A guide for economists, *Center Discussion Paper, Economic Growth Center*, No. 990, Yale Univ., Economic Growth Center, New Haven, Conn.
- <sup>80</sup> UNCTAD (2017), Fact sheet #12: Age structure, *UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2017 - Population*.
- <sup>81</sup> European Asylum Support Office (2016), Significant Pull/Push Factors for Determining of Asylum-Related Migration: A Literature Review.
- <sup>82</sup> Eggleston, K. N. and V. Fuchs, R. (2012), The New Demographic Transition: Most Gains in Life Expectancy Now Realized Late in Life, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26 (3), 137–156.
- <sup>83</sup> Rural-urban migration tends to be high in regions of high economic growth and growing industrial and service sectors. But even in countries such as India and Viet Nam, rural-rural migration remains considerable.
- Tacoli, C. (2009), Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility, *Environment & Urbanization* 21 (2), 513–525, DOI: 10.1177/0956247809342182.
- <sup>84</sup> Skeldon, R. (2017), International Migration, Internal Migration, Mobility and Urbanization: Towards More Integrated Approaches, *United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Sustainable Cities, Human Mobility and International Migration*, UN/POP/EGM/2017/7.
- <sup>85</sup> Clemens, M. A. (2014), Does development reduce migration?, in: R. E. B. Lucas, *International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development*, Chapter 6, and the literature cited therein.
- <sup>86</sup> The Mexican constitution was amended in 1992 providing the right to rent out or sell communally held land (ejidos). A wave of land privatisation and ownership consolidation followed.
- <sup>87</sup> Massey, D. S., Kalter, F. and Pren, K. A. (2008), Structural Economic Change and international Migration from Mexico and Poland, *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 60 (48), 134–161.
- <sup>88</sup> King, R. (2012), Theories and Typologies of Migration: Overview and primer, *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations*, 3/12.

- <sup>89</sup> Burzyński, M., Docquier, F. and Rapoport, H. (2018), The Changing Structure of Immigration to the OECD: What Welfare Effects on Member Countries? IZA Discussion Paper No. 11610.
- <sup>90</sup> UNCTAD (2016); Trade and Development Report, 2016: Structural transformation for inclusive and sustained growth.
- <sup>91</sup> Rodrik, D. (2016), Premature deindustrialization, *Journal of Economic Growth* 21 (1), 1–33.
- <sup>92</sup> Moch, L. P. (2011), Internal migration before and during the Industrial Revolution: the case of France and Germany, *European History Online*, Published: 2011-07-25.
- <sup>93</sup> Moch, L. P. (2011), Internal migration before and during the Industrial Revolution: the case of France and Germany, *European History Online*, Published: 2011-07-25.
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- <sup>95</sup> UNCTAD (2016); Trade and Development Report, 2016: Structural transformation for inclusive and sustained growth.
- <sup>96</sup> See the literature cited in Beine, M., Bertoli, S. and Moraga, J. F.-H. (2014), A practitioners' guide to gravity models of international migration, Documento de Trabajo 2014-03, fedea.
- <sup>97</sup> Bodvarsson, O. B. and van den Berg, H. (2013), The Determinants of International Migration: Theory, in *The Economics of Immigration: Theory and Policy*, Chapter 2, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-2116-0\_2
- <sup>98</sup> Tacoli, C. (2009), Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility, *Environment & Urbanization* 21 (2), 513–525, DOI: 10.1177/0956247809342182.
- <sup>99</sup> Wichert, J. and Ullrich, K. (2016), Besonderheiten der Konjunkturzyklen in Schwellenländern (*Characteristics of business cycles in emerging economies – in German only*), KfW Research Focus No. 142, and the literature cited therein.
- <sup>100</sup> Todaro, M. P. (1969), A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries, *American Economic Review*, 59 (1), 138–148.
- <sup>101</sup> Not unemployment is decisive, but employment. (Lucas S. 56)
- <sup>102</sup> Castles, S., de Haas, H. and Miller, M. J. (2009), *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- <sup>103</sup> Wang, P., Wong, T.-N. and Yip, C. K. (2018), Institutional Barriers and World Income Disparities, *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review*, Third Quarter 2018, 100 (3), 259-79. <https://doi.org/10.20955/r.2018.259-79>.
- <sup>104</sup> WEO April 2017: Pritchett 2000; Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik 2005; Jones and Olken 2008; Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer 2012
- <sup>105</sup> World Bank (2018), *Global Economic Prospects, June 2018: The Turning of the Tide?*, Washington, DC: World Bank. doi: 10.1596/978-1-4648-1257-6.
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